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Consciousness as a Physical
Process Caused by the Organization
of Energy in the Brain
Robert Pepperell*
FOVOLAB, Cardiff Metropolitan University, Cardiff, United Kingdom
To explain consciousness as a physical process we must acknowledge the role of
energy in the brain. Energetic activity is fundamental to all physical processes and
causally drives biological behavior. Recent neuroscientific evidence can be interpreted in
a way that suggests consciousness is a product of the organization of energetic activity
in the brain. The nature of energy itself, though, remains largely mysterious, and we do
not fully understand how it contributes to brain function or consciousness. According
to the principle outlined here, energy, along with forces and work, can be described
as actualized differences of motion and tension. By observing physical systems, we
can infer there is something it is like to undergo actualized difference from the intrinsic
perspective of the system. Consciousness occurs because there is something it is like,
intrinsically, to undergo a certain organization of actualized differences in the brain.
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INTRODUCTION
“If mental processes are indeed physical processes, then there is something it is like, intrinsically, to
undergo certain physical processes. What it is for such a thing to be the case remains a mystery.”
(Nagel, 1974)
The philosopher Thomas Nagel summarized one of our greatest intellectual challenges: how
to explain mental processes as physical processes. The aim of this paper is to outline a principle
according to which consciousness could be explained as a physical process caused by the
organization of energy in the brain1.
Energy is fundamentally important in all physical processes (Lotka, 1922; Schrödinger, 1944;
Heisenberg, 1958; Boltzmann, 1886). As the biophysicist Harold Morowitz (1979) put it: “the flow
of energy through a system acts to organize that system.” Light, chemical reactions, electricity,
mechanical work, heat, and life itself can all be described in terms of energetic activity (Chaisson,
2001; Morowitz and Smith, 2007; Smil, 2008) as can metabolic processes in the body and brain
(Magistretti, 2008; Perez Velazquez, 2009). It is surprising, therefore, that energy receives relatively
little attention in neuroscientific and psychological studies of consciousness. Leading scientific
theories of consciousness do not reference it (Crick and Koch, 2003; Edelman et al., 2011; Dehaene,
2014; Oizumi et al., 2014), assign it only a marginal role (Hameroff and Penrose, 2014), or treat it as
an information-theoretical quantity (Friston, 2013; Riehl et al., 2017). If it is discussed, it is either
as a substrate underpinning higher level emergent dynamics (Deacon, 2013) or as powering neural
information processing (Sterling and Laughlin, 2017).
1I take it that physical processes occur in time and space and are causally determined by the actions of energy, forces and work
upon matter. I take consciousness to be the capacity for awareness of self and world, which is particularly highly developed in
humans.
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This lack of attention is all the more surprising given that some
of the pioneers of neurobiology, psychology, and physiology
found a central place for energy in their theories, including
Hermann von Helmholtz (in Cahan, 1995), Gustav Fechner
(1905), Sigmund Freud (Gay, 1988), William James (James, 1907),
and Charles Sherrington (1940)2. There are, however, signs that
attention is turning again to energetic or thermodynamic-related
theories of consciousness in various branches of science (Deacon,
2013; Collell and Fauquet, 2015; Annila, 2016; Street, 2016;
Tozzi et al., 2016; Marchetti, 2018) and in philosophy of mind
(Strawson, 2008, 2017).
The present paper builds on this work by proposing that
energy, and the related properties of force and work, can
be described as actualized differences of motion and tension,
and that – in Nagel’s phrase – ‘there is something it is
like, intrinsically, to undergo’ actualized differences. Recent
neuroscientific evidence suggests that consciousness is a product
of the way energetic activity is organized in the brain. Following
this evidence, I propose that we experience consciousness because
there is something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo a certain
organization of actualized differences in the brain.
Several researchers have tackled the problem of consciousness
by treating the brain in principle as a neural information
processor (e.g., Tononi et al., 2016; Dehaene et al., 2017; Ruffini,
2017). I will argue that the governing principle of the brain at the
neural level is not information processing but energy processing.
The information-theoretic approach to measuring and modeling
brain activity, however, can usefully complement the energetic
approach outlined here.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND ENERGY IN THE
BRAIN
We do not fully understand the biological function of energy in
the brain or how it relates to the presence of consciousness in the
person3. Given that the human brain accounts for only 2% of the
body’s mass it demands a large portion of the body’s total energy
budget, some 20% (Laughlin, 2001; Magistretti and Allaman,
2013). Most of this energy is derived from the oxidization of
glucose supplied to the cerebral tissue through the blood. Roy
and Sherrington were the first to propose a direct correspondence
between changes in cerebral blood flow and functional activity
(Roy and Sherrington, 1890). Many features of human brain
anatomy, such as the number of blood vessels per unit of space,
the lengths of neural connections, the width of axons, and even
the ratio of brain to stomach size are thought to be determined by
the high metabolic demands associated with complex cognitive
processing (Allen, 2009).
For many neuroscientists, the main function of energy in
the brain is to fuel neural signaling and information processing
(Magistretti, 2013); energy supply is seen as a constraint on the
2For further discussion on the historical context see Pepperell (2018).
3Although for the sake of brevity I refer in this paper to consciousness occurring in
the brain, consciousness is something that people undergo. Brains cannot sustain
consciousness independently of the people in which they are housed (Pepperell,
1995).
design and operation of the brain’s computational architecture
(Laughlin, 2001; Hall et al., 2012; Sterling and Laughlin, 2017). It
has been calculated, for example, that the rate of energy supply
available to the human brain places an upper ‘speed limit’ on
neural processing of about 1 kHz (Attwell and Gibb, 2005).
And Schölvinck et al. (2008) estimated that conscious perception
of sensory stimuli increases energy consumption in primate
brains by less that 6% compared to energy consumption in the
absence of conscious perception4. They attribute this relatively
small change to an energy efficient “design strategy” of the brain
in which decreases in neural activity play a functional role in
information processing as well as increases. Energy, on these
accounts, plays no direct role in higher mental processes, like
consciousness.
Robert Shulman and colleagues have argued there is a direct
connection between energy in the brain and consciousness
(Shulman et al., 2009; Shulman, 2013). By studying the
progressive loss of behavioral response to external stimulus from
wakefulness to deep anesthesia, they found a corresponding
reduction and localization of cerebral metabolism (a marker
of energy consumption). Therefore, they argue, high global
metabolism is necessary for consciousness. However, they are
also clear that high global metabolic rates are not sufficient as
patients with locked-in-syndrome and those who suffer from
some forms of epileptic seizure can register high levels of global
brain metabolism without exhibiting the observable behavior that
we expect from a conscious person (Shulman, 2013; Bazzigaluppi
et al., 2017). Shulman’s thesis has been challenged on several
grounds (Seth, 2014). For example, it has been pointed out that
behavioral responsiveness may be inadequate as a measure of
sentience given that vestiges of consciousness have been detected
in people diagnosed as being in a vegetative state with a low
cerebral metabolism (Owen et al., 2006). Moreover, some patients
who recover from a vegetative state to regain consciousness
do so despite having substantially reduced cerebral metabolism
compared with normal controls (Laureys et al., 1999; Chatelle
et al., 2011).
In recent years there has been a growing interest in intrinsic
brain activity (Clarke and Sokoloff, 1999; Raichle, 2011). This
background or spontaneous activity occurs in the resting awake
state in the absence of external stimulation or directed attention,
and its energy demands can greatly exceed those of localized
activation due to task performance or attention. The discovery
of this so-called ‘dark energy’ in the brain (Raichle, 2010) was
greeted with some surprise in the neuroscience community and
remains controversial (Morcom and Fletcher, 2007). Work on
intrinsic activity led to the identification of a ‘default mode
network’ in the brain, an extended set of interconnected regions
that uses high levels of energy when a person is in a non-attentive
state. Energy use drops significantly in this network when a
more cognitively demanding task, such as paying attention to a
stimulus, is performed (Shulman et al., 1997; Raichle et al., 2001).
Vanhaudenhuyse et al. (2009) reported that connectivity within
the default mode network in patients with severe brain-damage
4Strictly speaking energy is not consumed but converted from one form to another.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 November 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 2091
fpsyg-09-02091 November 2, 2018 Time: 17:40 # 3
Pepperell Consciousness as a Physical Process
deteriorates in proportion to the degree of conscious impairment,
suggesting it plays an important role in sustaining consciousness.
Meanwhile, it is somewhat surprising to find that energy use
during non-rapid eye movement sleep remains at ∼85% of that
in the waking state, while during rapid eye movement sleep it can
be as high as in the waking state (Dinuzzo and Nedergaard, 2017).
At the same time, consciousness can be minimally sustained
with energy use at only 42% of the level that occurs in healthy
conscious individuals, suggesting that much cerebral metabolic
activity in normal waking states does not directly contribute
to consciousness (Stender et al., 2016). Many anesthetic agents
are thought to obliterate consciousness because they reduce the
global rate of cerebral metabolism (Hudetz, 2012). Administering
ketamine, on the other hand, increases brain metabolism yet
can still lead to loss of responsiveness (Pai and Heining, 2007).
Overall, it seems we find no clear correlation between the total
amount of energy used by the brain, or the location where the
energy is used, and the level of consciousness detectable in the
person.
CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE
ORGANIZATION OF ENERGETIC
PROCESSING IN THE BRAIN
An alternative, or perhaps complementary, way to think about
this issue is in terms of how the energetic activity in the brain
is organized rather than its global level or localization. Indeed,
this has implicitly been the focus of recent research that aims
to provide quantitative measures of consciousness levels. In one
study, researchers used transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)
to send a magnetic pulse through the brains of healthy controls
and patients with various states of impaired consciousness
(Casali et al., 2013). By measuring how the pulse perturbed
the cortex the researchers were able to determine the relative
complexity and extent of the pathways through which the pulse
propagated and correlate these to levels of consciousness. The
researchers calculated a perturbation-complexity index (PCI)
that quantified the levels of consciousness present in each person
they studied. This method was further validated as a reliable
objective measure of levels of consciousness by Casarotto et al.
(2016).
The PCI was calculated using data from
electroencephalographic (EEG) measurements of the cerebral
perturbation following the TMS. Images from the EEG were
filtered into binary data that was then analyzed using a Lempel–
Ziv algorithm, a commonly used information-theoretical
technique in which complexity is measured as a function of data
string compressibility, with more complex data strings being less
compressible (Ziv and Lempel, 1977; Aboy et al., 2006). Other
researchers have developed similar information-theoretical
methods for quantifying the complexity of brain activity and
levels of consciousness. King et al. (2013) analyzed data from 181
EEG recordings of patients who were diagnosed with varying
states of impaired consciousness and applied a measure of
weighted symbolic mutual information (wSMI) that sharply
distinguished between patients in vegetative state, minimally
conscious state, and conscious state.
Although information theoretic tools were being used to
analyze and interpret the data in these studies we should note
that what was actually being detected by the experimental
procedures was not information per se but the organization
of energetic activity or processing in the brain. Energetic
processing – the processes by which the brain regulates the
flow of energy through its structures – is routinely detected at
varying degrees of spatial and temporal resolution, either directly
or indirectly, by neuroimaging techniques such as positron
emission tomography (PET), functional magnetic resonance
image (fMRI), and EEG (Niedermeyer and Lopes da Silva,
1987; Bailey et al., 2005; Shulman, 2013). Referring again
to the study by Casali et al. (2013), the perturbations from
which the PCI was calculated were generated by a pulse of
magnetic energy from the TMS and were imaged with EEG
that measures electrical voltage differences, that is, fluctuations
in energetic potentials between clusters of neurons in the
cortex (Niedermeyer and Lopes da Silva, 1987; Hu et al.,
2009; Koponen et al., 2015). The PCI and wSMI can therefore
be interpreted as measures of the complexity or organization
of energetic processing in the brain during the experimental
procedures.
Subsequent research has directly investigated the connection
between brain metabolism (how the brain regulates energy
conversion), brain organization, and levels of consciousness by
combining EEG measures with PET, a more specific measure
of cerebral metabolism. Chennu et al. (2017) collected data
from 104 patients in varying states of conscious impairment
using both techniques. By analyzing this data, they determined a
metric that discriminated levels of consciousness to a high degree
of accuracy. This study built on previous work by Demertzi
et al. (2015) that used fMRI to correlate a measure of intrinsic
functional connectivity in the brain with levels of consciousness.
The PCI method has been further validated by a study combining
EEG and 18F-fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG)-PET (Bodart et al.,
2017), so reinforcing the link between levels of consciousness and
the organization of metabolic activity in the brain.
Current brain imaging methods do not strictly speaking
detect information processing5. They do, however, detect
changes associated with increases in energy consumption (via
fMRI and PET) and fluctuations in electrical potential energy
(via EEG), both of which reliably correlate with changes in
mental function and behavior. On the basis of what we can
observe, the brain operates according to the principle of
energetic processing. The evidence discussed above suggests
levels of consciousness are determined by the organization
of energy processing in the brain rather than on its global
level or localization; wakeful conscious states are associated
with more complex organization. To understand why this
5The authors of Wollstadt et al. (2017), for example, studied the breakdown
of local information processing under anesthesia using information theoretic
methods. They point out that the EEG procedure they used did not directly record
information processing in the brain but local field potentials, that is, fluctuations
in quantities of potential energy.
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might be we need to consider the concept of energy in more
depth.
ENERGY
The concept of energy that we are familiar with today emerged
only slowly from its beginnings in the late eighteenth century.
It developed through the study of thermodynamics in the
nineteenth century, and then found its place at the center of
theories of relativity, quantum mechanics, and cosmology in the
twentieth (Coopersmith, 2010). In colloquial usage energy refers
to ideas of vigor, vitality, power, activity, and zest. In scientific
usage, however, energy is defined as the ability of a system to
do work6. Work is defined as the transfer of energy involved in
moving an object over a distance by an external force, at least
part of which is applied in the direction of the displacement
(Duncan, 2002). Scientists and engineers often refer to energy
as an abstract property: “Energy is a mathematical abstraction
that has no existence apart from its functional relationship to
other variables” (Abbott and Van Ness, 1972; Rose, 1986). It is
a property that can be converted from one form to another,
and in an isolated system the total quantity is conserved (Smil,
2008).
Despite the enormous amount of interest in the physics of
energy and its central importance in so many branches of science,
its nature remains in many ways mysterious (Feynman, 1963;
Smil, 2008; Coopersmith, 2010) and it has been the subject
of relatively little philosophical interrogation (Coelho, 2009).
Treating energy as an abstract accounting quantity is perfectly
satisfactory for many scientific purposes, where there is little
reason to question its nature. But if energetic activity plays a
significant role in consciousness, as the evidence cited above
suggests it might, then its nature deserves closer scrutiny.
The concept of energy in the European intellectual tradition
can be traced back to Aristotle who used but never precisely
defined the term energeia (ενε´ρε´εια) to convey the ideas of action,
activity, actuality, being at work, and acting purposefully (Sachs
in Aristotle, 2002). Scholars have long debated the best way to
translate energeia from ancient Greek. The word ‘energy’ itself
has been used, as have ‘activity’ and ‘actuality,’ but ‘being-at-
work’ is currently favored, partly due to energeia’s roots in ergon,
the ancient Greek for work (Aristotle, 1818; Ellrod, 1982; Sachs
in Aristotle, 2002). Modern scholars have tended to quarantine
the ancient concept of energeia from contemporary ideas about
energy. But Aristotle’s term may still have value when thinking
about energy’s nature. This is especially so when we take into
account the ideas of Aristotle’s intellectual forebear Heraclitus,
whose cosmological view was informed by three main principles:
(i) that activity in nature is driven by ‘fire’ – which has been
interpreted as synonymous with energy (Heisenberg, 1958), (ii)
is subject to continual flux or motion, and (iii) is structured by
antagonism or tension and (Kahn, 1989; Sachs in Aristotle, 2002).
6There seems to be an ambiguity in some textbooks about whether energy is an
enabling property possessed by a system or body, e.g., Duncan (2002), or a measure
of such a property, e.g., Rennie (2015). I will take energy to be a property possessed
by systems or bodies, quantities of which can be measured.
We now understand there to be two main forms of energy:
kinetic and potential. Kinetic energy is possessed by objects due to
their motion, while potential energy is possessed by objects due to
their relative position or configuration. All other forms of energy,
such as thermal, electromagnetic, solar, chemical, gravitational,
atomic, and so on are in themselves forms of either kinetic or
potential energy (Duncan, 2002; Smil, 2008). Much can be said
about kinetic and potential energy, including the fact that they
are causally efficacious, that is, they cause real change and activity
in the material world7. But I want to draw attention here to the
fact that they are both manifestations of difference. Kinetic energy
is difference as motion or change; potential energy is difference
as tension or antagonism. Neither kinetic nor potential energy
inhere absolutely in objects but are relational properties; motion
or change occurs relative to a frame of reference, and tension or
antagonism occurs between one object, or force, and another.
The concept of difference then is of utmost importance when
considering the nature of energy and the related properties of
force and work8.
ACTUALIZED DIFFERENCE
If energy is the ability to do work then the displacement of a
body undergoing work is due to force, defined as the “agency
that tends to change the momentum of a massive body” (Rennie,
2015) or less formally as a “push or a pull.” Forces act and react
antagonistically in equally opposing pairs and are therefore, like
energy, manifestations of difference. The discipline of physics
finds it convenient to treat energy, forces and work as distinct
quantities to be balanced in abstract mathematical equations. But
in nature they are integral and actualized, acting collectively in
time and space with causal efficacy.
By observing nature, we can infer there is ‘something it is
like’ to be a physical system undergoing antagonistic forceful
interactions, and what it is like will vary as the interactions vary9.
There is something it is like, for example, to be a piece of rope
undergoing great tension that is different from what it is like to
be the same rope when relaxed, or for a rock to crash to earth
having been in freefall. Some effects of these interactions may be
observed from an extrinsic perspective; we may hear a creak or a
crunch. But the something it is like to undergo the interactions
themselves is an intrinsic property of the observed system to
which the extrinsic observer has no access. It is for this reason
that its presence and nature can only be inferred10.
7“Energy may be called the fundamental cause for all change in the world”
(Heisenberg, 1958). The neurobiologist Gerald Edelman neatly defined causal
efficacy as “The action in the physical world of forces or energies that lead to effects
or physical outcomes” (Edelman, 2004).
8Neuroanthropologist Terence Deacon defines energy as a “relationship of
difference” (Deacon, 2013). Note that energy is difference, but not all differences
are energy; red is a color, not all colors are red.
9Nagel clarified the term ‘something it is like’ as meaning not what something
resembles but ‘how it is’ for the system (Nagel, 1974).
10Note that this claim is not as far-fetched as it might at first seem: If (i)
consciousness in people is a physical process – due to energy, forces and work – and
(ii) we infer the presence of consciousness in other people on the basis of observing
them extrinsically – as we habitually do – and (iii) there is something it is like to
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This is not to claim that forces acting at the subatomic scale
between particles, or at the macroscopic scale in rope or rock,
undergo anything like the experience we undergo as conscious
humans11. Something it is like-ness is not in itself sufficient for
consciousness. Rather it is to recognize that:
(i) energy, forces, and work are actualized,
(ii) they are expressions of difference, and
(iii) there is something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo
actualized difference.
I use the term actualized difference to refer to the active,
antagonistic nature of energy, forces and work in a way that
encompasses Heraclitean cosmology, Aristotelian energeia, and
contemporary scientific descriptions of energy. Mathematical
equations can represent actualized differences with abstract
differences, in the form of symbols and numbers, but not
whatever it is that puts the “fire in the equation” (Hawking,
1988)12. For that we must refer back to nature itself – to the
territory rather than the map (Korzybski, 1933).
ENERGY AND INFORMATION
For many contemporary scientists, information is a fundamental
property of nature. For some it is the most fundamental
property of nature (Davies, 2010). Neuroscientists often claim
that the brain operates according to the principle of information
processing. We read that “the brain is fundamentally an organ
that manipulates information” (Sterling and Laughlin, 2017)
and that brains are “information processing machines” (Ruffini,
2017). Individual neurons are treated as information processing
units, while neural firing patterns are converted into sequences
of binary digits (1s and 0s) that encode information (Koch,
2004). Recent prominent theories claim consciousness is identical
with (Tononi et al., 2016) or results from (Dehaene et al., 2017)
certain kinds of information structures or information processes
in brains.
Information is variously and sometimes imprecisely defined in
science (Capurro and Hjørland, 2003), its meaning is still strongly
contested (Lombardi et al., 2016; Roederer, 2016), and many
people regard it as being to some extent subjective, relativistic, or
observer-dependent (von Foerster, 2003; Deacon, 2010; Werner,
2011; Logan, 2012; Searle, 2013; de-Wit et al., 2016). The term
is often used in science colloquially (meaning ‘what is conveyed
by an arrangement of things’) or “intuitively” (Erra et al., 2016).
And where one might expect to find a clear definition, such as in a
be a conscious person – as we assume there is – then (iv) we routinely infer the
presence of an intrinsic something it is like-ness in a physical process on the basis
of observing it from an extrinsic perspective. However, as discussed below, human
consciousness is a particular kind of something it is like-ness that occurs only when
certain conditions are met.
11In discussions of the nature and behavior of forces at the microscopic level
we often find references to the way they ‘feel’ (Feynman, 1963), or the way
they ‘experience’ each other in fields (Rennie, 2015). It would be interesting to
investigate what motivates the use of such terms in this context.
12The difference between 1 and 0, for example, is an abstract difference conceived
within a conscious mind.
dictionary of physics, biology or chemistry, none appears (Hine,
2015; Rennie, 2015, 2016).
The most widely cited technical definition of information is
that given by Shannon (1948) as part of his mathematical theory
of communication. For Shannon, information does not refer to
meaning or semantics, as it does colloquially. The information
is the amount of uncertainty in a message (a sequence of
data) measured through probabilistic analysis of its elements.
Information theory has developed into an exceptionally powerful
mathematical tool that can be used, among many other things,
to measure the complexity of physical systems. But a quantity of
Shannon information is a measure of what can be known about
a system as distinct from the system itself. The information lies
with the measurer rather than the measured13.
The other commonly cited definition of information is
Gregory Bateson’s “a difference that makes a difference” (Bateson,
1979). Like his fellow cybernetic theorist Wiener (1948), Bateson
sharply distinguished information from energy. Difference is not
a property of what he calls the “ordinary material universe”
governed by energetic activity. It is not subject to the effects
of impacts and forces but is an abstract, relational property of
the mind that exists outside the realm of physical causation:
“Difference, being of the nature of relationship, is not located
in time or space.” Information defined according to Bateson as
a “non-substantial” abstract difference cannot be used to explain
consciousness as a physical process14.
The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT)
proposed by Tononi et al. (2016) provides an alternative, non-
Shannonian, definition of information as “a form in cause-effect
space.” Cause-effect space, according to their theory, contains a
“conceptual structure” – a constellation of related concepts – that
is specified by the “physical substrate of consciousness” (PSC),
this being the precise complexes of neural activation involved in
any experience. Each conscious experience is identical with this
“form,” denoted 8max when maximally integrated. But while IIT
is presented as a theory of integrated information, it could equally
serve as a theory of how energetic processing is organized since
the PSC consists in the causally interrelated patterns of neural
firing that are identical with the conscious experience.
Treating brains as neural information processors does not help
us to understand consciousness as a physical process because
information, according to the commonly accepted definitions,
is not a physical property of brains at the neural level; there
is no information in a neuron15. It is useful, however, to apply
13Arieh Ben-Naim sets out in some detail how Shannon information is a
probabilistic measure rather than a physical property (Ben-Naim, 2015). Note that
the act of measurement presupposes a conscious mind capable of carrying out the
measurement procedure and interpreting the result.
14Had he a fuller understanding of the nature of energy Bateson might not have
been so dismissive about its role in mental processes. In Mind and Nature (Bateson,
1979) he referred only to kinetic energy (which he defined as “MV2”), thus ignoring
potential energy, and was by his own admission “not up to date in modern physics.”
In fact, slightly modifying Bateson’s much-cited phrase to an actualized difference
that makes a difference yields a description of the essence of energetic action that
is, the way energy, forces and work act antagonistically to effect change and cause
further actions.
15Brains – as parts of people – process information in the colloquial sense, just as
they process abstract ideas, equations, numbers, thoughts, emotions, or memories.
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information-theoretical methods to study the organization of
physical systems, such as brains. Wiener (1948) stated: “. . .the
amount of information in a system is a measure of its degree of
organization. . .” As exemplified in several studies and theories
cited here, we can measure and model the way the organization
of energetic processes in the brain contributes to the presence of
consciousness in a person16. But the abstract difference between
0 and 1 is not equivalent to the actualized difference between a
neuron at rest and firing.
THE BRAIN AS A ‘DIFFERENCE ENGINE’
The challenge of explaining consciousness as a physical process
is made more tractable, I suggest, by recognizing that brains
operate on the principle of energetic processing. Neurons, in
concert with other material structures such as astrocytes and
mitochondria, convert, distribute, and dissipate electro-chemical
energy through highly organized pathways in order to drive
behaviors critical to the organism’s survival. This makes sense
when we consider the fact that organisms inhabit a physical
world that is structured through the actions of energy, forces
and work. To survive and prosper in this world they must
continually work to acquire new supplies of high-grade or free
energy to maintain an internal state far from thermodynamic
equilibrium (Boltzmann, 1886; Schrödinger, 1944; Schneider and
Sagan, 2005). Besides internal regulation, nervous systems enable
organisms to perform two major tasks: discriminating between
variations in environmental conditions, such as temperature,
acidity, salinity, nutrient levels, or presence of predators, and
moving toward environmental conditions that are beneficial to
survival and away from those that are harmful.
The mechanisms that enable performance of these tasks can be
seen at work in organisms with relatively simple nervous systems,
such as the C. elegans worm (Sterling and Laughlin, 2017).
Chemical gradients in the environment activate chemosensory
neurons on the worm’s surface that connect via interneurons
to motor neurons that control the action of dorsal and ventral
muscles, which, in turn, control the worm’s movement (de Bono
and Maricq, 2005). In this way, differences of chemical potential
energy in the environment are converted into differences of
electro-chemical energy in the sensing apparatus of the organism
and then into differences of chemical energy in the muscles,
which, by antagonistic action, are converted into the kinetic
energy of the organism’s movement. The organism makes
But they do so as a consequence of the underlying energetic processing (conversion,
distribution, and dissipation) going on in neural tissue. Computers also ‘process’
information in the colloquial sense. Mechanically and electronically speaking,
however, they actually manipulate energy states (voltages, light, etc.) the results
of which we, as conscious people, interpret informationally. It is worth noting
that all mechanical information processing necessarily entails the dissipation of
a certain amount of energy (Landauer, 1961). Recent experiments have confirmed
this principle and demonstrated the intimate link between energy and what many
refer to as information (Bérut et al., 2012).
16Logan (2012), in work undertaken with Stuart Kauffman and others, defines
‘biotic information’ as the organization of the exchange of energy and matter
between organism and environment – a further example of information theory
being used to quantify the biological organization of energy flows.
discriminations in the environment relevant to its interests so
that it can take appropriate actions in response.
We can see the same basic principle at work in biology of
far greater complexity. The human visual system, for example,
is highly demanding on the brain’s energy budget (Wong-
Riley, 2010). But the evolutionary benefit of human vision
is the capacity it confers to guide finely controlled bodily
actions in light of environmental conditions. This is achieved
through an intricate sequence of energy conversions, beginning
with the arrival at the retina of electro-magnetic energy from
the environment and cascading through numerous energetic
exchanges in the neural pathways of the visual system that
progressively differentiate features of the environment (Hubel
and Livingstone, 1987). This frequently results in the conversion
of electro-chemical energy in the motor system and muscles to
the kinetic energy of bodily movement (Goodale, 2014). The fact
that our complex biology supports so rich a repertoire of sensory
discriminations and motor responses may be only a difference of
degree rather than of kind with the humble worm.
We might think of sensory cells responding to stimulation
from environmental energy by becoming excited or by increasing
local neural activation. But vertebrate photoreceptors are,
contrary to what one might expect, hyperpolarized by photon
absorption. This means they ‘turn off’ when exposed to
light and ‘turn on’ in the dark, even though they use more
energy in the dark (Wong-Riley, 2010)17. Meanwhile, some of
the neurobiological evidence cited in Section “Consciousness
and Energy in the Brain” cautions us against assuming that
sensory stimulation always results in increased neural activation.
Decreases in activation in the brain can occur in response to
cognitively demanding tasks, yet can go unnoticed in imaging
studies with methodologies designed to detect task-evoked
increases in metabolic rate above baseline (Raichle et al., 2001;
Schölvinck et al., 2008). And of course not all neural activation is
excitatory; neural inhibition is vitally important in brain function,
as elsewhere in the nervous system, and this also entails an
energetic cost (Buzsáki et al., 2007). There is evidence that an
optimal balance between neural excitation and inhibition (E-I
balance) in the cerebral cortex is critical for the brain to function
well (Zhou and Yu, 2018).
In light of these mechanisms, the energy-hungry brain might
be understood as a kind of ‘difference engine’ that works
by actuating complex patterns of motion (action potential
propagation) and tension (antagonistic pushes and pulls between
forces) at various spatiotemporal scales. Firing rates and electrical
potentials vary within neurons, between neurons, between
networks of neurons, and between brain regions, so maximizing
the differential states the brain undergoes. A decrease in
activation, or a reduction in firing rate, can create a differential
state just as much as an increase. And, as is indicated by the work
of Schölvinck et al. (2008), deactivation may be an energy efficient
way for the brain to increase its repertoire of differential states.
Maintaining a global E-I balance across spatiotemporal scales,
meanwhile, is thought to promote ‘efficient coding’ in sensory
17It turns out this arrangement is energy efficient for the visual system overall
(Wong-Riley, 2010).
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FIGURE 1 | Stills from a video feedback sequence generated by the author. These patterns are created by pointing a video camera at a screen showing the
camera’s output. What begins as tunnel-like images soon ‘blossoms’ into an ever-changing pattern of great diversity and fascinating beauty. © Pepperell (2018).
and cognitive processing (Zhou and Yu, 2018). All this lends
support to the idea, proposed above, that one of the roles of
energetic activity in the brain is to efficiently actuate differences
of motion and tension that advance the interests of the brain-
bearing organism. It is the actualized difference that makes the
difference.
ENERGETIC ORGANIZATION AS THE
CAUSE OF CONSCIOUSNESS
In theory, we could account for all the highly complex processes
occurring in the brain in terms of energy, forces and work, that is,
as physical, chemical and biological processes. But the seemingly
unassailable problem of how any of these processes might cause
consciousness remains. The principle outlined here – that there
is something it is like, intrinsically to undergo differences due
to the antagonistic action of energy, forces and work – may
offer a toehold in the slippery face of the problem. There is
something it is like, intrinsically, to be a tense muscle that is
different from being a relaxed muscle. There is something it
is like, intrinsically, to be networks of neurons in fantastically
complex states of actualized differentiation from other networks,
with action potentials propagating through vast arrays of fibers.
But all this something is it like-ness is not in itself sufficient
for consciousness. Muscles are not conscious, and networks of
neurons are active in the brain when we are in dreamless sleep or
under anesthesia. What is it about the organization of energetic
processes in the brain, as discussed in Section “Consciousness
and the Organization of Energetic Processing in the Brain,” which
determines the level of consciousness we experience?
We gain some insight into the association between
consciousness and the organization of energetic processing
in the brain from studies of anesthesia. The reason why
anesthetic agents obliterate consciousness is not understood
(Mashour, 2004). Recent work has focused on the ways in which
they interfere with the brain’s capacity to generate patterns of
localized differentiation (often termed ‘information’) and to bind
together or integrate those patterns across widely distributed
brain networks (Hudetz, 2012; Hudetz and Mashour, 2016).
Evidence from studies on the neurological effects of anesthetics
suggests that consciousness is lost as distant regions of the brain
become functionally isolated and global integration breaks down
(Lewis et al., 2012). The idea that consciousness depends on
maximizing differentiation and integration in the brain lies at the
heart of IIT (Tononi, 2012; Oizumi et al., 2014).
A potential mechanism supporting global integration of local
differentiation is recurrent or reentrant processing, in which
widely distributed areas of the brain engage in complex loops
of cortical feedback via massively parallel connections (Edelman
et al., 2011; Edelman and Gally, 2013). A number of studies
of the effects of anesthetics have shown that they disrupt
feedback connectivity, and hence integration, particularly in the
frontoparietal area of the brain (Lee et al., 2009; Hudetz and
Mashour, 2016). Studies of brain organization during deep sleep
have also reported an increase in modularity consistent with the
loss of integration among regions of the brain found in the awake
state (Tagliazucchi et al., 2013). This suggests that the presence
of consciousness in a wakeful person depends on a certain level
of functional integration supported by cortical feedback loops
(Edelman, 2004; Alkire et al., 2008) but it is not known how or
why.
A major contribution of cybernetic theory was to recognize
the importance of feedback mechanisms for controlling behavior
in mechanical and living systems (Wiener, 1948; Bateson, 1972).
Feedback systems are self-referential; one part of the system
casually affects another, which in turn affects the first. Such
systems are apt to generate behaviors that are an irreducible
property of the system as a whole (Hofstadter, 2007; Deacon,
2013). One example is video feedback, which occurs when a video
camera is pointed at a monitor showing the output from the
camera (Crutchfield, 1984). When correctly arranged the monitor
will at first show a tunnel-like image that will then spontaneously
‘blossom’ into an intricate, semi-stable pattern of remarkable
diversity and fascinating beauty (see Figure 1)18. Since this is
an energetically actuated process we can infer, following the
arguments already given, that there is something it is like to
be the video feedback system in full bloom, from its intrinsic
perspective. But it is not conscious.
Gerald Edelman proposed that “phenomenal experience
itself is entailed by appropriate reentrant intracortical activity”
(Edelman and Gally, 2013). The human brain undergoes
18Examples can be found on YouTube.
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recursive or reentrant behavior of an unimaginably higher order
of complexity than in the video system19. But the underlying
operating principle may be analogous. Video feedback arises
because the system is organized as a self-observing loop. If we
assume that reentrant activity in the brain is also a kind of self-
observing loop in which processes in one part the brain both
affect and are affected by processes in other parts, then we can
envisage a kind of pattern blooming in the brain analogous to
that we see in video feedback. This pattern would be actuated by
sufficiently organized electro-chemical activity, among neurons
and neurotransmitters, channeled through reentrant neural
circuits.
The something it is like-ness a brain organized in this way
would be undergoing is of a different order to that of a brain with
diminished integration in dreamless sleep or under anesthesia.
No other physical system, as far as we know, has the same capacity
for complex (differentiated and integrated) recursive processing
as the human brain, and that dynamic organization reaches its
apogee when we are wakefully conscious, as suggested by the
evidence cited in Section “Consciousness and the Organization of
Energetic Processing in the Brain.” When the energetic processes
in our brains are operating at a certain level of dynamic recursive
organization – the “appropriate reentrant intracortical activity” –
then we undergo something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo
something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo something it is
like . . . recursively. In other words, there is something it is like,
intrinsically, to be something it is like, recursively, to undergo
the particular organization of actualized differences found in the
conscious brain. For this, we have the most direct and irrefutable
evidence possible – what it’s like to undergo our own conscious
experience20.
Is it reasonable then to propose that consciousness is caused
by the way energetic activity is dynamically and recursively
organized in the brain? It is no less reasonable than attributing
the causes of other biological phenomena, such as the behavior of
the nematode worm, to the way energetic activity is organized. If
consciousness is a physical (biological and chemical) process, and
if physical processes are caused by energetic activity (alongside
forces and work), then consciousness, in principle, could be
caused by energetic activity and the way it is organized.
NATURALIZING CONSCIOUSNESS
In 1937–8, Charles Sherrington gave a series of lectures on
the relationship between energy and mind, collected in the
19One way to quantify this relative complexity would be to follow the proposal
of Chaisson (2001) and compare the energy rate density (a measure he calls
8m) between the two systems. Note also that Edelman and Gally are careful
to distinguish cybernetic feedback in machine control systems from re-entrant
processing in the brain, the latter being far more complex (Edelman and Gally,
2013).
20‘I think therefore I am undergoing a certain recursive organization of actualized
differences.’ Models of consciousness based on feedback loops in the brain have
been discussed before, including by Douglas Hofstadter in his book I am a Strange
Loop (Hofstadter, 2007). I have also previously proposed a feedback model of
consciousness partly inspired by Edelman’s theory of reentrant processing as part
of an attempt to design an artificially conscious work of art (Pepperell, 2003).
volume Man on his Nature (Sherrington, 1940). In line with
the physics of his day, Sherrington understood the natural
world to be composed of forms of energy. But he could not
conceive how the mind could be forged from energy: “The
energy-concept of Science collects all so-called ‘forms’ of energy
into a flock and looks in vain for the mind among them.”
The mystery was deepened for him by the knowledge, then
emerging through studies of electrical and metabolic activity
in the brain, of how intimately energy and mental function
must be linked. He was compelled to wonder “Is the mind
in any strict sense energy?” but reluctantly concluded that
“. . .thoughts, feelings, and so on are not amenable to the
energy (matter) concept.” They lie beyond the purview of
natural science, despite the “embarrassment” this causes for
biology.
If we are to naturalize consciousness, then we must
reconcile energy and the mind. I have outlined a principle
that may help to explain consciousness as a physical process.
It entails re-examining the modern scientific concept of
energy in the light of Aristotle’s energeia and its Heraclitean
roots. Accordingly, we arrive at a view of physical processes
in nature as actualized differences of motion and tension.
Sherrington understood that “Energy acts, i.e., is motion.” But
he went on “. . .of a mind a difficulty is to know whether
it is motion.” Treating the brain as a difference engine that
works to actualize and organize differences of motion and
tension to serve the interests of the organism is, I submit, a
natural approach to understanding consciousness as a physical
process.
CONCLUSION
If consciousness is a natural physical process then it should
be explicable in terms of energy, forces and work. Energy is a
physical property of nature that is causally efficacious and, like
forces and work, can be conceived as actualized differences of
motion and tension.
Evidence from neurobiology indicates that the brain
operates on the principle of energetic processing and that a
certain organization of energy in the brain, measured with
information theoretic techniques, can be reliably predict
the presence and level of consciousness. Since energy is
causally efficacious in physical systems, it is reasonable
to claim that consciousness is in principle caused by
energetic activity and how it is dynamically organized in
the brain.
Information in the biological context is best understood
as a measure of the way energetic activity is organized, that
is, its complexity or degree of differentiation and integration.
Information theoretic techniques provide powerful tools for
measuring, modeling, and mapping the organization of energetic
processes, but we should not confuse the map with the territory.
Actualized differences, as distinct from abstract differences
represented in mathematics and information theory, are
characterized by there being something it is like, intrinsically,
to undergo those differences, that is, to undergo antagonistic
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states of opposing forces. All actualized differences undergo this
something it is like-ness, but not all contribute to consciousness.
It is proposed that a particular kind of activity occurs in
human brains that causes our conscious experience. It is a certain
dynamic organization of energetic processes having a high degree
of differentiation and integration. This organization is recursively
self-referential and results in a pattern of energetic activity that
blossoms to a degree of complexity sufficient for consciousness.
If consciousness is a physical process, and physical processes
are driven by actualized differences of motion and tension, then
there is something it is like to undergo actualized differences
organized in a certain way in the brain, and this is what we
experience – intrinsically21.
21 The explanatory principle outlined here might be construed as a form of
panpsychism or panexperientialism. My claim is not that consciousness is a
fundamental property of nature, universally distributed. Rather, I claim it is a
property of all physical systems that there is something it is like, intrinsically,
to undergo actualized differences, a certain organization of which causes
consciousness.
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